(1992) located the problem under the question of whether our yes same fictional to the end and Cape owe their existence to a same if real that would be its creator, the creator of the plot in which we represent different roles. To answer this question the authors throw hand of an analogy drawn from the field of artificial intelligence. They invite us to imagine a robot that makes up stories with fictional characters. This robot also has the particularity that has certain devices similar to our senses, that allow you to navigate through the objects in the outside world. Now well, given this particularity is that stories that makes up this robot and the characters that represent them are beginning to have a resemblance to the description of the robot trajectories in their world, does this mean that the robot has a self as the creator of the fictional characters in their stories or stories? The response of the authors is not, since the robot actually knows nothing of your environment or the stories and the characters that Crea. The same thing would happen with us.
The computer of the robot can be analogada with our brains that neither does. It is the mind that interprets patterns of behaviour in which we are involved and that the brain controls in some way or another. But that doesn’t mean that it knows what is happening and intends to refer to their own experiences. A feature of this interpretation is that it can be continuously modified by modifying at the same time what we are, that is, our sense of self. Taking as a starting point to Michael Gazzaniga and his studies of people with brain splinter (split-brain subjects), the authors ensures that the modules of the mind are not equally accessible to each, i.e. they have no perfect way of intercommunication so that a module experience and processes in a certain way is played by another from their particular strategies for processing information.